Abstract The development of formulas to distribute federal funds to states based on demographic data continues to challenge data and policy analysts. Analysts must forward the best objective statistical analysis and data inputs to formula specifications while acknowledging the politics of the legislative process that authorizes federal funding formulas. This article evaluates the federal funding formula for the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) using key formula components of need, effort, capacity, and performance. We also examine the operationalization and measure of the target population in the SCHIP funding formula. Legislative decisions on formulas are, by nature, based on compromises that balance competing policy objectives. The analyst's role is to continually review current research standards, data quality, and relevant formula inputs and make recommendations to refine federal funding formulas to better target resources to their intended populations.
Introduction
ety of mechanisms including (1) general program appropriations, where federal funds are allocated to executive branch agencies to develop and implement specific projects; (2) block grants, which are capped federal funds allocated to states to spend for broadly defined purposes; (3) categorical grants-in-aid, where federal funds are targeted to specific categories of spending, including narrowly defined sets of services or specific target populations; and (4) earmarked funds, which are narrowly targeted, allocated by law to states or programs for specific purposes, and cannot be used for other purposes. In each of these mechanisms, the funding is transferred from the federal government to states and localities, often through the use of federal funding allocation formulas (Melnick 2002) .
In fiscal year (FY) 2002, the federal government transferred $362.4 billion to states and localities, with over one-half of these funds (56.4 percent) administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. Census Bureau 2003) . Examples of federal grant programs include the Community Mental Health Services Block Grant, administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), administered by the Food and Nutrition Service (FSN) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); and Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, administered by the U.S. Department of Education, which provides funds for disadvantaged students to school districts. The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) is a close-ended categorical matching grant (Downes and Pogue 2002 ) that provides federal matching funds to states for developing public health insurance programs to decrease the number of low-income uninsured children. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services administers SCHIP.
Funding formulas are the mechanisms used to distribute federal funds to states and localities. These formulas are designed to account for key program goals, the estimated need for federal assistance, and the capacity of the states to financially support new programs. For matching grant programs, state effort is an additional component of the funding formula. How these formulas are designed and what data sources are used as formula inputs determines the distribution of federal funds to the states. Federal allocations to states are typically based on a mathematical formula that requires various statistical inputs. Federal funding formulas incorporate official statistics and statistical estimates based on national survey data to estimate the basic formula components: need, capacity, and effort. In addition, performance measures have also been included in funding distribution, primarily in the form of bonuses or penalties to reward states that either have or have not met predetermined program targets or objectives.
Formula inputs have evolved from the use of basic population indicators derived from population data from the decennial census or survey data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS-ASEC) to the development of empirically driven model-based estimates. For example, model-based estimates derived from survey and administrative data are used to estimate the number of WIC eligible by state, and a more complex empirical Bayesian model is used to fit current population survey (CPS) data for state and county estimates of children in poverty for Title I school funding allocations (Zaslavsky and Schirm 2002) . The type and accuracy of these formula inputs can affect a program's target efficiency, that is, the accurate targeting of available funds to achieve program objectives. Technical data issues and statistical procedures used to produce formula inputs can interact with the structure of a funding formula to produce unintended consequences depending upon the source of data used to measure a specific target population over time.
The increased use of demographic survey estimates as inputs to federal funding formulas has resulted in statistical agencies, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau, becoming increasingly important players in the development of funding formulas. However, the final specifications of funding formulas typically result from a contentious legislative process involving political compromises among competing objectives. To facilitate effective translation of program objectives into accurately targeted aid formulas, analysts must provide the best formula inputs available and continue to refine them as better data and statistical models become available (Downes and Pogue 2002; Melnick 2002) .
This article assesses the role of funding formulas and formula inputs using SCHIP as a case study. While SCHIP is a relatively new grants-inaid program, there is ongoing debate about the legislatively developed federal funding formula and its ability to effectively target federal funds to states. We examine these issues and present recommendations for improvement. The first section of the article focuses on the design of the funding formula using the key formula components of need, effort, capacity, and performance. We begin with a discussion of the intended program goals and target population as key components of program implementation. We include a description of the legislative changes made to the funding formula in the first years of program implementation in the context of intended objectives and perhaps unintended consequences. The second part of this article focuses on the operationalization and measurement of the target population in the SCHIP funding formula. We discuss strengths and weaknesses of the data sources as well as potential sources of measurement error. We conclude with recommendations to improve both the federal funding formula components and the data sources that provide inputs to the measurement of key formula components. The goal of this article is to provide input to the political process to improve the SCHIP funding allocation process, anticipating that these discussions will occur during the required reauthorization of appropriations for SCHIP in the 110th Congress. The article also highlights the administrative and technical difficulties inherent in implementing a program like SCHIP and the distributional impact of using less-than-perfect data inputs to distribute limited federal dollars across states. We conclude with specific suggestions on modifications to the formula and to the formula data inputs, acknowledging that any changes to the allocation formula will result in winners and losers, which will introduce renewed political interest in, and debate about, the details of the funding formula.
Overview of Distribution of State Children's Health Insurance Program Funding
The State Children's Health Insurance Program was passed in 1997 as a bipartisan effort to increase health insurance coverage for low-income uninsured children. The program is funded through a federal grants-inaid program with a legislated cap on the annual federal appropriation. The federal government provides federal matching payments to states to "initiate and expand child health assistance to uninsured, low-income children" (42 U.S.C. § 1397aa). In theory, states cannot spend more than their annual federal allocation, so annual program expenditures are essentially capped. However, many states did not spend their initial allocations in the early years of the program, providing for an increasing amount of unspent SCHIP funds. Administrative actions provided for the reallocation of unspent funds to states that had spent more than their initial allocation (Peterson 2006b) .
States have considerable flexibility in the design of their SCHIP program. States may administer SCHIP as an add-on to existing Medicaid programs, create a SCHIP program distinct from Medicaid, or pursue a combination of these strategies. Federal SCHIP allocations to states are calculated using a formula with two key components: (1) the child component factor (CCF), which includes the weighted sum of a state's number of low-income children and the number of low-income uninsured children; and (2) the health cost factor (HCF), which provides an adjustment for the health care delivery cost differences among states (Davern et al. 2003a; Czajka and Jabine 2002) . Table 1 provides an overview of the gradual introduction of the CCF in the SCHIP funding formula updated with all legislated changes to the date of this writing. Table 2 provides detail on the legislated changes to the SCHIP funding formula since its passage in 1997, including the introduction of holdharmless provisions and cumulative ceilings in 1999. The formula and 
Components of the SCHIP Federal Formula
We turn now to a discussion of the formula, including a discussion of the key attributes and legislated changes over time. We begin first with a discussion of the program goals and target population followed by a description of how the federal funding formula addresses need, effort, capacity, performance, and state effort. We also include a description of SCHIP's hold-harmless provisions and thresholds as well as more recent efforts to reallocate unspent SCHIP funds.
Program Goals. Compared to some federal programs, the program goals of SCHIP are quite straightforward: to reduce the number of low-income uninsured children through funds directed to states to initiate and expand health insurance coverage (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS] 2005) . A related objective is to facilitate access to needed preventive and other health care services to improve the health status of lowincome children (CMS 2005) . The mechanisms used to help states achieve these objectives include providing states flexibility in program design and giving states direct funding for outreach and enrollment to reach children who are currently eligible for both SCHIP and Medicaid programs but who are currently not enrolled. The federal government provides matching payments to state SCHIP expenditures similar to those disbursed according to Medicaid's federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP). The program was designed to provide incentives to states to develop and implement SCHIP through enhanced matching rates (i.e., rates higher than their Medicaid FMAP) to provide health insurance coverage to low-income uninsured children. However, unlike the Medicaid program, which has open-ended entitlement, SCHIP is funded through a fixed federal annual appropriation. The funding formula is used to determine the upper bound of federal SCHIP payments to states.
The State Children's Health Insurance Program's target population includes uninsured children in families with incomes too high for Medicaid but too low to afford insurance in the private market (Czajka and Jabine 2002 Need. Need represents the potential cost of the program based on the size of the target population and the cost of providing services (National Research Council 2003) . The SCHIP funding formula includes two components to provide for an estimate of state need: (1) the CCF, which is a blend of an estimate of the number of low-income children and the number of low-income uninsured children in each state, and (2) the state HCF, which is a measure of the cost of health care within a state.
The CCF is a blend of two state estimates based on data from the CPS-ASEC: (1) the number of low-income children, and (2) 1998 -2000) . The introduction of the second CCF, the number of children below 200 percent of FPL regardless of insurance status, was accelerated by one year to address the concerns of stability in the CPS-ASEC data inputs (see further discussion in the next section) and the fact that once children were covered under SCHIP they would no longer be included in the target population (Czajka and Jabine 2002) . The updated formula included a 75 percent weight for the number of uninsured children below 200 percent of FPL for FY 2000 and a 25 percent weight for the number of uninsured children moving to 50/50 percent weight for the two CCFs in 2001 -2007. Concerns still persist about the CCF in that it does not currently account for those low-income children enrolled in SCHIP. The implication for this omission is that states could actually lose funding if they successfully enroll children in both SCHIP and Medicaid, thus reducing the number of uninsured low-income children. Program costs, however, still exist for those enrolled in SCHIP. The measure of the CCF also allows for lowincome uninsured children enrolled in either Medicaid or private insurance to be counted in the estimate of need.
The HCF is the second component of need and an estimate of health care costs used as a proxy for estimated program expenses. Estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the HCF is represented by a ratio of the average state wage in the health services industry relative to the national health services wage (Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration 2001). The BLS estimate is based on an average of the three most recent years of wage and salary data available.
The CCF reflects an attempt to measure each state's need by estimating the number of children falling into the target population for SCHIP. The SCHIP formula combines the estimated target population with the HCF in order to target funds to states with the greatest number of low-income uninsured children, while controlling for the fact that providing health care for a child in one state may cost more than for a child in another state. The CCF is multiplied by the HCF for each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia to generate an aggregate state-specific factor. The product of the two components is summed to a national total. The total federal SCHIP dollars are then allocated to states based on the state proportion of the national total adjusted for the hold-harmless and threshold provisions.
Effort. Effort is a measure of the actual local resources spent on the services authorized under the federal program (National Research Council 2003 table 2 ). First, states were allowed up to three years to use their initial allocations, after which the remaining funds were to go into a redistribution pool. For FY 1998 and FY 1999 , states that exceeded their allotments were given an amount equal to the amount of their excess spending, and remaining states received an amount equal to the ratio of state's unspent allotment to the total amount of unspent funds for that fiscal year. For FY 2000 and FY 2001 , states that did not use their allotment within three years could retain 50 percent of unspent funds. The remaining funds went into the redistribution pool and were given to states that exceeded their FY 2000 allotments based on the ratio of state spending in excess of allotment to total excess spending for states that have overspent. For FY 2002 and later, the initial BBA 1997 provisions apply: after the threeyear period, unspent allotments are redistributed to states that have fully expended their allotments (CRS 2005a). These efforts reflect an attempt to balance spending by "rewarding fast-spending states with additional funds, while giving slow-spending states continued access to a portion of their unused funds" (CRS 2005a) .
There has been a persistent and relatively large amount of unused SCHIP funds since the program's inception. In the early years this was due to the slow start-up and implementation of programs. Yet, several states have consistently underspent their allotments while others have consistently overspent. Seven states received a portion of the redistribution of unspent funds in each of the five years that the funds were available (CRS 2005a ). This problem is not likely to go away in the near term. Although the FY 2007 SCHIP appropriation to the states was approximately $5 billion, state SCHIP spending of federal funds was projected by the CRS at "$6.5 billion, 30 percent more than the FY 2007 allotments" (Peterson 2006b: 10) . The Congressional Research Service projects that at least thirty-seven states will exceed their allotment, with seventeen states expected to experience a shortfall without an additional legislated appropriation. The other twenty states have prior year balances to cover their overspending, at least for FY 2007.
It is projected that only thirteen states will spend below their FY 2007 SCHIP allotment; Tennessee and Washington have the lowest spending at 30 and 40 percent, respectively, below their funding levels. The remaining thirty-seven states are expected to exceed their allotments with the highest overspending occurring in Rhode Island (453 percent), Massachusetts (298 percent), and New Jersey (266 percent) (Peterson 2006b ).
The process of redistributing unspent funds has, perhaps, led several states to expect continued funding to meet program costs that exceed their initial allocation. There are no current provisions for redistribution beyond FY 2007, and legislation will be required to prevent state shortfalls in the SCHIP program. On the contrary, if the intent of Congress was as initially passed - that SCHIP was not an entitlement program, but a limited block grant - states may need to more carefully assess their federal allotment as the cap on their federal funds (CRS 2005b).
Capacity. Capacity reflects the ability of states or other entities to raise revenue to finance their share of program costs (National Research Council 2003) and is a unique measure in programs in which state expenditures are matched by federal payments. There is a separate formula for determining federal financial participation (FFP) in the SCHIP program distinct from the SCHIP allocation formula. The matching rate for SCHIP is based on an enhanced FMAP, which is calculated based on the ratio of a state's per capita income to the national per capita income. The formula provides more matching funds to states with relatively lower levels of per capita income. The key problem with using per capita income is that it does not include other resources such as business, capital gains, or other potential revenue-generating enterprises. Some have suggested using other capacity measures such as the representative tax system (RTS), which measures the average tax revenue a state or locality could raise relative to a national average (Blumberg, Holahan, and Moon 1993; National Research Council 2003) . However, the use of per capita income for FMAP in Medicaid has not changed since its inception, partly due to its broad acceptance and use over time.
The SCHIP federal matching rate is based on the rate used for the Medicaid program with the intent that the federal government pays a greater share of program costs for states with lower per capita income. The SCHIP matching rate is slightly higher than the FMAP for the Medicaid program. The "enhanced" rate varies from 65 -85 percent compared to Medicaid matching rates of 50 -85 percent. The higher matching rates were designed to encourage states that had not previously covered lowincome children under their Medicaid program to provide needed coverage at a lower cost (Czajka and Jabine 2002) . However, the way in which the formula was designed may have inadvertently produced an unintended outcome: "states with the lowest Medicaid match rates (presumably those with the greatest fiscal capacity) are awarded the largest increases under SCHIP, while states with the highest Medicaid match rates receive only marginally higher match rates under SCHIP" (Czajka and Jabine 2002) .
The SCHIP federal match is equal to 70 percent of the Medicaid match plus 30 percentage points, not to exceed 85 percent total. For those states with a high Medicaid match, the enhanced SCHIP match is only slightly greater than what they receive under Medicaid. For example, states with the lowest Medicaid matching rate of 50 percent (e.g., Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington, among others) had SCHIP matching rates of 65 percent, which is 15 percentage points higher than Medicaid. Those states with the highest Medicaid matching rates have a much lower SCHIP enhancement in the range of 6 -8 percent. Mississippi went from a Medicaid matching rate of 77.08 percent to a SCHIP rate of 83.96 percent, an increase of 6.88 percentage points; New Mexico went from 74.30 percent to 82.01 percent, an increase of 7.71 percentage points; and West Virginia went from 74.65 percent to 82.26 percent, a 7.61 percent increase. These matching rates may not be enough incentive for states with the greatest need to invest state resources in new SCHIP programs.
Performance. There are no specific performance measures built into the SCHIP formula. In fact, retaining the number of uninsured children living below 200 percent of FPL introduces a somewhat perverse outcome. That is, as an individual state enrolls more low-income uninsured children into its SCHIP program, one input to the formula (number of uninsured low-income children) declines, lowering the state's allocation. While the hold-harmless ceilings and thresholds mitigate some of the loss of funds, the formula design has not addressed the continued costs of the SCHIP program to provide health insurance coverage to low-income populations. Those states that are less aggressive in program implementation will not reduce the number of low-income uninsured children and will retain a higher proportion of the allocation. This does not mean these states will actually spend their greater allotment, and in fact they may actually have SCHIP programs operating at less than maximum capacity.
Given data challenges and variation in program design across states it may be difficult to develop explicit performance standards for SCHIP. For example, CMS requires states to submit reports on the impact of SCHIP on reducing the number of low-income uninsured children. Yet the Office of Inspector General (OIG 2004) audited these reports and found that the data and methods used by states varied greatly and that only twenty-two states accurately reported on the change in the number of low-income uninsured children. Given that information on changes in the number of uninsured must come from survey data, most states simply reported SCHIP enrollment from their existing administrative data. In addition, while the funding formula includes a specific definition of low income as 200 percent of FPL, states have defined low income with eligibility criteria that range from 140 -350 percent of FPL. More effort would be required to develop better and consistent measurement of changes in the number of low-income uninsured children that could be used in an explicit reward or bonus system.
Another implicitly stated goal of the SCHIP program is to maintain levels of private employer-based coverage of low-income children. This objective is articulated by the requirement that states implement measures to effectively prevent "crowd-out," which is the replacement of private health insurance coverage through public program expansions. Many states have implemented waiting periods, requiring children to have been without health insurance coverage for a certain period of time. However, explicit measurement is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. To date, the measurement of crowd-out and the ability of states to prevent crowd-out has been elusive (Davidson, Blewett, and Call 2004) .
Finally, and perhaps more important, there is limited information on the impact that SCHIP has on improving access and health status for children by state. The Office of Management and Budget (2004: 138) , in its FY 2004 budget summary, concluded that "without a core set of national performance measures, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has not been able to adjust program priorities based on national goals or to improve the program's performance in the areas of utilization, access, health outcomes, or financial management." Developing appropriate performance indicators is a required first step to introducing financial incentives into the federal funding allocations to states for SCHIP.
Other Program Components. Two other funding formula components include the hold-harmless provisions and the allocation thresholds. Holdharmless provisions are a key component of funding formulas and are used to stabilize the level of funding from year to year due, in part, to the excess variation in the CPS-ASEC state-level estimates (Zaslavsky and Schirm 2002) . The hold-harmless provisions were introduced as part of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) of 1999 (P.L. 106 -113). The total budgeted SCHIP allocation is divided among the states based on each state's proportion of the total allocation (based on the CCF multiplied by the HCF) adjusted for the hold-harmless and threshold provisions (Czajka and Jabine 2002) . The provisions provide that no state can receive less than 90 percent of its previous year's proportion of the total allotment and no state can fall below 70 percent of its 1998 -1999 baseline proportion of the total allotment. 1 In addition to the floors, there is also a ceiling in that no state can obtain more than 145 percent of its 1998 -1999 baseline share of the total federal SCHIP allocation in any subsequent year (Department of Health and Human Services, CMS 2001). In addition to the holdharmless provisions mentioned above, no state can receive less than $2 million per year or less than 10 percent of the previous year's allocation (ibid.).
To illustrate how these provisions are applied, we take a specific state example. For FY 2002, Alabama's CCF was 303,000 (rounded) and its HCF was 0.9688. The state-specific factor is the product of the CCF and the HCF, which equals 293,075.5. This product represented 1.5729 percent of the total sum of the product of CCF and HCF for all the states. Thus, Alabama would be allocated 1.5729 percent of the total allotment before the hold-harmless provisions are administered. After the hold-harmless provisions are applied to the state allocations, the adjusted amount of the total that Alabama is allocated is 1.5764 of $3,082,145,000, which equals $48,585,422 (ibid.).
The hold-harmless provisions become interesting for those states that do not spend up to their annual allotment. The hold-harmless provisions essentially guarantee that they will continue to underspend in the future, creating additional funds for the redistribution pool and new incentives for more aggressive states to overspend. Over time, this may potentially erode the block-grant nature of the program, in which states are directly paid for what they spend with a flexible cap for certain states.
Describing the components of the SCHIP funding formula tells only one part of the story. The other part is found in how the funding formula components are defined and measured and what data are used as inputs to estimate formula components.
Survey Data Inputs to Measurement of Need
The poverty-based federal programs strive to accurately direct allocations to the areas of greatest need and to provide enough flexibility to retarget federal funds according to fluctuations in need over time. The National Research Council (2001) suggests that federal funding formulas include each of the following elements: (1) the desired concept or issue being addressed, (2) the geographic entity on which the funding allocation is based, (3) the target population, (4) timeliness, and (5) accuracy of measurement. These criteria should be used to continuously evaluate funding formulas as programs and data inputs change over time.
The SCHIP funding formula includes criteria 1, 2, and 4 above. The formula states the concept to be addressed (number of low-income uninsured children) and the geographic entity upon which the funding formula is based (the state). In addition, timeliness is accounted for by the CCF and HCF in which inputs are based on the most recent three-year averages of data available to the BLS (for the HCF) and the CPS-ASEC (for the CCF). The remaining components - the target population and measurement accuracy - are more problematic for most funding formulas including the SCHIP formula. Specifying a target population that matches a program's policy objectives and ensuring the accuracy of measurement are two criteria that are commonly at odds. As a general rule, the more specifically defined the target population is, the less accurate the measurement tends to be.
In this section we examine the process of matching policy objectives with the identification and measurement of the target population; the accuracy of the measurement of the target population for SCHIP, including discussions of the issues surrounding the large variance in the CPS-ASEC state-level estimates of uninsurance; and evidence of bias in those estimates.
Matching Policy Objectives to Specific Target Populations
The available data used for inputs to funding formulas have two significant weaknesses that hinder programs' abilities to effectively target funds. The first is that the specific variables required to estimate a target population may simply not be available in the survey data. The second is that, even if the right variables are available, a survey must have a large enough sample at the state level to develop a reliable estimate of the target population. Both of these problems are evident in the data inputs for the SCHIP formula.
Estimates from survey data often lack the specificity necessary to appropriately operationalize the intended target population. For example, the target population of SCHIP is non -Medicaid eligible uninsured children living in families below 200 percent of FPL. It is difficult to obtain a precise estimate of this population with existing survey data. Each state has different Medicaid eligibility rules, some with higher income eligibility thresholds, some with asset tests or specific citizenship requirements, and still others with earnings disregards Dubay, Haley, and Kenney 2000) . Even if all data needed to measure a target population were available, the estimate is likely to be based on very few cases. Because of the limitations imposed by survey data measurement and concerns about having enough observations from the target population to make sound estimates, a proxy population is often used to gauge the level of need within specific areas. Although SCHIP was designed to "cover children in families with too much income to qualify for Medicaid, but too little to afford private coverage" (Czajka and Jabine 2002) , the funding formula input is based on the broader CCF of those children in families with incomes below 200 percent of FPL and those below 200 percent of FPL who are uninsured. This estimate includes children under 200 percent of FPL who are enrolled in either private health insurance plans or the Medicaid program in each state. The estimate of need also includes low-income children who are undocumented or illegal residents (currently included in the CPS-ASEC) who are not eligible for SCHIP or Medicaid in most states (Dubay, Haley, and Kenney 2000) .
There is also some concern about specifying the target population in the funding formula as SCHIP experiences "mission creep." States are using the HIFA waiver process to reallocate unused SCHIP funds to provide coverage to other populations, such as parents of children enrolled in SCHIP and adults with no children (CRS 2005a). The current state-level flexibility in SCHIP design has introduced a mismatch between the target population used to determine SCHIP funding (via the CCF) and the population for which the funds are actually being spent. There are two ways to consider this HIFA-induced mismatch. The first would be that the objectives of SCHIP might need to be reevaluated in light of how the program has matured since 1997 to include parents or families of uninsured children in the target population. The second would be to continue as is, that is, to target low-income uninsured children but allow states to make use of the money they do not spend on the target population to provide coverage for other populations not specifically mentioned in the legislative objectives of the program. These, however, are policy decisions that the current legislation and the funding formula do not address.
Whether the current target population is expanded to include all those currently receiving SCHIP funds through the HIFA waiver process and/or the current CCF formula-defined target population is refined to be more in line with the specific population in need, as specified by the policy objectives of SCHIP, the limitations imposed by the data sources to estimate the target population will play a critical role in determining SCHIP allocations.
Accuracy of Measurement
It is important that the inputs to funding formulas be accurate - that is, inputs should have minimum levels of both variance and bias. The variance of an estimate is a function of the sampling error and random nonsampling error. Sampling error is a function of the sample design and sample size (Kalton 2002) . Nonsampling error can involve many random measurement problems - such as how a survey item is interpreted by one respondent versus another - or editing procedures performed to clean survey data.
The variance of an estimate is, therefore, a function of three main things: (1) the number of observations used to derive an estimate, (2) the sample procedure used to acquire the observations, and (3) the random nonsampling error (Kalton 2002) . Statistical methods give us an adequate estimate of the variance associated with a specific estimate used in a fund-ing formula. However, there is considerably less certainty regarding the amount and sources of bias. Bias is the result of systematic nonsampling error, and there can be many known and unknown sources of bias that affect survey estimates (Biemer et al. 1991) .
The CCF is calculated using data from the CPS-ASEC, which can produce reasonable measures of health insurance coverage and poverty for each state as a whole. However, the CPS-ASEC was not designed to produce precise state-level estimates of the specific target population used in the CCF. Therefore, in using the CPS to target funds to this specific subgroup within each state, the sample upon which the state estimates are based is small, leading to concerns about the size of an estimates variance.
The CPS-ASEC state estimates used in the SCHIP formula also have a small but statistically significant bias due to the procedures employed by the Census Bureau to impute (i.e., replace) missing data ). Because many respondents (up to 20 percent) do not answer either the income or health insurance questions when they are surveyed, the Census Bureau must estimate or impute these missing values. The procedures used to impute these values create an unintended bias in the state estimates of coverage and poverty that make up the CCF portion of the SCHIP formula. In the remainder of this article we demonstrate the amount of variance in the baseline formula allocations and its continued impact on 2006 allocations, and we describe a source of bias in the CCF estimates that are used to allocate federal funds to states.
Variance. The CPS-ASEC is the only federal survey to produce state-level estimates of health insurance coverage for people of all ages on an annual basis . Even with the three-year pooled data used in calculating the CCF, the estimates still have large confidence intervals. In an attempt to remedy this problem, Congress appropriated $10 million annually to the Census Bureau to produce more precise annual state estimates (State Health Access Data Assistance Center 2001). The legislation specifically required the Census Bureau to increase the CPS-ASEC sample size to more accurately estimate the number of uninsured low-income children who are potentially eligible for SCHIP. The number of households that were interviewed for the CPS increased from approximately 50,000 in the nonexpanded sample to 78,000 in the expanded sample in 2001. However, the sample expansion varied significantly across states, as shown in table 3. The sample expansion ranged from a 23 percent increase in the sample for New Mexico to a 171 percent increase in New Hamp- shire (Davern et al. 2003b ). The number of households interviewed also varied greatly, ranging from 800 interviewed households in Mississippi to 5,609 in California. When developing estimates for a more refined substate population, such as the number of uninsured children living in each state below 200 percent of FPL, the sample size becomes extremely small (Davern et al. 2003b ). The CPS-ASEC sample expansion resulted in an average reduction of 30 percent in the size of the standard error of the CCF per state. However, the SCHIP formula thresholds were based on the unexpanded CPS-ASEC using the number of low-income uninsured children only (Davern et al. 2003a ). Thus, the baseline threshold for the SCHIP allocation is still very unstable due to its large variance. This has significant implications for the way in which the cumulative ceilings and thresholds are applied since they are benchmarked to the earlier SCHIP proportion of allotments that used the unstable sample estimates prior to the sample expansion.
To demonstrate the amount of variance in the CCF, we estimated the 95 percent confidence interval of each state's baseline SCHIP formula allocation. We then divided the confidence interval by the SCHIP allocation to Bureau (2001) highlight how large the confidence interval is relative to the actual state SCHIP allocation. Following the methodology we developed for another analysis (Davern et al. 2003a) we assumed that the sampling error in the SCHIP formula was due solely to the CCF and that the HCF component was measured without error. 2 The baseline estimate serves as the threshold for subsequent state allocations and is the baseline by which the holdharmless provisions are applied. Table 4 presents the baseline (FY 1998) SCHIP allocations by state and the 95 percent confidence intervals around those allocations. The 95 percent confidence intervals are the product of each state's allocation and 1.96 times the pooled standard error of the CCF in the SCHIP formula. As noted previously, in FY 1998 and FY 1999 only the number of uninsured low-income children was used in the CCF (see table 1 ). Across all states and the District of Columbia, the average SCHIP allocation was $82,829,000 with a 95 percent confidence interval of ±$21,365,000. The confidence interval for the federal SCHIP allocation ranged from $5,892,000 in Alaska to $209,586,000 in California. Looking at the range of the confidence interval as a percent of the total state allocation puts the extent of the variability into clearer focus. In California, the confidence interval represented ±12.3 percent of the total state SCHIP allocation; in Vermont, the confidence interval was ±64.4 percent of the total state SCHIP allocation. Across all states the average confidence interval represented ±25.8 percent of the total SCHIP allocation. That is, on average, the state SCHIP allocation could be off by as much as ±25 percent using an estimate of the number of low-income children in a state based on data from the CPS-ASEC.
A fair amount of this variability is constrained through the SCHIP formula's hold-harmless and ceiling provisions that do not allow losses in excess of 10 percent of the previous year's proportion of the total allocation, cumulative gains over 145 percent of the 1998 -1999 proportion of the total allocation, or cumulative losses below 70 percent of the 1998 -1999 proportion of the total. However, the sheer magnitude of the baseline confidence intervals in table 4 shows the lack of precision in the current SCHIP formula because of the impact this variability has on future allocations due to the hold-harmless and ceiling provisions being linked to the 2. To simulate the impact of the imputation bias, we estimated that the total bias represents approximately 1.5 percent of the total FY 2002 allocation of $45.9 million. The per state bias averaged ±$900,000. Nineteen states had estimated misallocations in excess of $1 million due to bias. 1998 -1999 estimates. A state fortunate enough to have an estimate of lowincome children significantly higher than the actual amount in 1998 -1999 will retain that bias as long as the current ceilings and floors are maintained and vice versa (Czajka and Jabine 2002; Zaslavsky and Schirm 2002) . Thus, what started as random sampling errors in the first years' estimates may have become institutionalized bias over time because the formula continued to use the unstable estimate of the 1998 -1999 baseline threshold for applying floors and ceilings.
We have estimated the impact of this bias in table 5 by looking at the FY 2006 state shares of the federal allotments along with their relationship to the floors and cumulative ceilings using the FY 1998 -1999 share as the baseline required by law. Before any hold-harmless provisions were applied, seven states exceeded the cumulative ceiling, two states came Bureau (1994 Bureau ( -1996 under the cumulative floor, and nine states came within 10 percentage points of the cumulative ceiling and floor. The most extreme case is that of Hawaii, whose unadjusted FY 2006 proportion of the total SCHIP allotment was 190 percent over its 1998 -1999 allocation. Six other states also exceed the cumulative ceiling in FY 2006 (Vermont, Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Washington) and five more were within 10 percentage points of the cumulative ceiling (Utah, Alaska, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Illinois). If the unadjusted proportion of the total in 2006 is considered the most accurate estimate as to the need level within a state, then at least seven states are getting less of the federal allocation and six more states are in danger of running up against the ceiling. Hawaii is getting $3.7 million less (almost 30 percent of its 2006 allotment) based on the 2006 formula after applying the hold-harmless provisions, ceilings, and thresholds. On the other extreme, New Mexico received $6.5 million more after applying the hold-harmless provisions, ceilings, and thresholds to their initial unadjusted allocation based on the 2006 formula.
The lack of precision in the baseline estimates (as demonstrated in table 4) of the number of low-income children has lead to significant problems over time, because the initial random variation has become biased as it has been locked into the formula through hold-harmless provisions and cumulative ceilings (Davern et al. 2003a) . A state fortunate enough to have an estimate of uninsured low-income kids that was high due to random variation in the baseline year has this allotment locked in as they cannot go below a hold-harmless floor over time. A state unfortunate enough to have an estimate of uninsured low-income children that was too low in the baseline year due to random variation has its allotments capped over time.
The formula floor states that no state can lose more than 70 percent of the 1999 share from one year to the next. There were two states whose SCHIP share dropped below the floor: New Mexico's unadjusted SCHIP allocation for FY 2006 was 59.3 percent of the 1998 -1999 share, and Oklahoma's was 62.4 percent of the 1998 -1999 share. Four other states were within 10 percentage points of going under the floor: Alabama, California, Louisiana, and Wyoming. The lack of precision in the baseline estimates of the number of low-income children leads to significant problems over time, as the initial random error becomes biased because it is locked into the formula over time and can make SCHIP difficult to manage at the state level (Davern et al. 2003a ).
Bias. The concern regarding bias in the CPS-ASEC CCF estimates is based on the way in which the Census Bureau imputes missing data. The Census Bureau uses a process called "hot-deck imputation" to replace missing data with reported values in the CPS-ASEC. This process segments the population based on a variety of characteristics associated with the variable being imputed. The object of segmenting the population into homogenous groups is to try to create the closest match between the respondent with the missing values and a "data donor." For example, segmentation variables could include gender, employment, race, ethnicity, and age. The resulting population segments are homogeneous groupings (e.g., women eighteen to sixty-five years of age who are employed full time and are black and non-Hispanic) and are all placed into a single segment. If a respondent within a homogeneous segment has a missing value for the variable being imputed, then another respondent from within the same population segment is chosen at random to share that value with the respondent whose value is missing. In the end, the two respondents will share the same value and the respondent who originally had a valid value is called a "donor."
Notably, in imputing missing CPS-ASEC values, the state of residence is not one of the variables used to segment the population for either income or health insurance coverage imputation. As a result, respondents from Texas (the state with the highest uninsurance rate) can donate health insurance coverage responses to recipients in Rhode Island (the state with the lowest uninsurance rate) (Mills 2001) . A similar mismatch can occur with the income imputation, although only within the four census regions, because the census region is used as a segmentation variable for income imputation. Seventeen percent of the income data and 11.3 percent of the health insurance coverage data result from imputed values that do not take into account state of residence, and this leads to biased state estimates .
Bias in the CCF estimates due to CPS-ASEC imputation techniques results in a moderate amount of funding bias in any specific year. A few states are getting more than they would have received if unbiased estimators were available (and vice versa). Although the overall bias is relatively small, the total amount of dollars misallocated will only grow disproportionately in favor of some states and at the expense of others over time. 3 
Discussion and Recommendations
Recent evidence shows that SCHIP has led to a significant reduction in uninsured children (Blewett, Davern, and Rodin 2004; Hudson, Selden, and Banthin 2005) and is widely considered a successful grants-in-aid program. This is due in part to successful enrollment in SCHIP but also the increased enrollment in Medicaid due to the funding of new outreach and enrollment activities to reach Medicaid-eligible children. While SCHIP has provided new funding for state programs for children's health insurance, we have highlighted some concerns about the SCHIP funding formula both in terms of its design and in the data inputs to formula components.
The Committee on National Statistics (National Research Council 2000: 153) recommends that analysts systematically and routinely assess the impact of error of formula inputs and make efforts to reduce that error. This may involve "improving the accuracy of a given set of estimates or changing a provision in the formula." Federal funding formulas should be consistently evaluated to determine whether their operationalization of the target population is consistent with the policy's objectives and whether there is a large amount of variance and/or bias in the estimates used as inputs to the funding formula. As the science and data are improved, the formula and its inputs should also improve. Hold-harmless and threshold provisions will provide needed stability as these changes are implemented and perhaps phased in over time. However, locking in formula inputs when new and improved methods are available simply locks in potential "randomness of the base-year results" (Czajka and Jabine 2002: 425) . We recommend that the SCHIP funding formula be reassessed as part of the SCHIP reauthorization anticipated later this year and be reevaluated every five to seven years.
The following discussion summarizes the key issues we have identified in the SCHIP funding formula, as well as specific recommendations we make to address specific components of the SCHIP funding formula.
Need
Using the number of uninsured low-income children to calculate the Child Component Factor (CCF) of the SCHIP formula is problematic.
individual RSEs ranging from 6.2 percent in California to 33 percent in Vermont. We feel that these numbers are not only suspect for publication in some states but that they certainly should not be used in a funding formula.
As a state enrolls more low-income uninsured children into SCHIPan explicit program goal - the number of uninsured low-income children goes down, effectively decreasing a state's SCHIP allocation (Peterson 2006a) . While the weight of this component of the CCF (the number of low-income uninsured children) decreases (from 100 to 50 percent) as the formula is phased in, the use of this element is not totally eliminated. In addition, while the number of uninsured children is reduced, the costs of SCHIP do not decline, and they might actually increase due to increased enrollment.
We concur with Czajka and Jabine (2002: 424) that the existing CCF should be evaluated to consider developing an alternative that includes "the sum of the number of low-income uninsured and an adjusted administrative estimate of children enrolled in SCHIP."
This remedy would address the concerns over the perverse incentive for enrolling low-income children in SCHIP in which success in enrolling eligible children results in reduced funding. The formula would include an estimate of the number of low-income uninsured children and the number of low-income children enrolled in SCHIP. While using SCHIP enrollment data is not without its own host of technical issues, such data will likely be required to assure an adequate estimate of state need that will be directly tied to adequate federal funding levels for successful state SCHIP programs.
Capacity
The design of the SCHIP matching rate, such that low Medicaid FMAP states get a larger FMAP rate enhancement and high FMAP states get a smaller FMAP rate enhancement, should be reconsidered. Because states with the lowest per capita incomes are likely to need the greatest incentives to develop and expand programs for children, the enhanced SCHIP match should be redesigned to provide the resources and incentives to states with greatest need.
We suggest a uniform percentage increase of 10 -15 percent above each state's Medicaid matching rate. We further suggest that the use of the state's average income in the matching rate be reassessed to consider using a measure that includes business income as well as resident income - or total taxable resources - to more adequately reflect state resource capacity (U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO] 2000; Czajka and Jabine 2002) . 
Effort
The current method of redistributing SCHIP funds rewards states that have overspent their annual SCHIP allocations; moreover, many SCHIP programs may now have built-in expectations of federal support beyond initial allocation levels. The redistribution process should be reexamined because it effectively takes resources from states with arguably more need (as evidenced by their inability to support more SCHIP enrollees) and reallocates them to states with less need (as evidenced by their expanded SCHIP enrollment enabled by greater resources and stronger infrastructure).
Redistribution of unspent funds is an unusual practice in the history of federal block grants. Most federal grant programs allow states to build up reserves. Under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, for example, states are allowed to keep unspent funds and build up reserves, but TANF specifies that these reserves must be spent to advance program priorities (Green Book 2004) . More common for block grants, however, is that the federal allocation does not meet the state-level need. For example, in a block-grant program such as WIC, states generally spend their annual federal allotments and institute waiting lists for program participation. In 2002, the WIC program served approximately 7.5 million women, infants, and children, while an estimated 8 million individuals were eligible (Green Book 2004) . Thus, because unspent blockgrant funds are rare, redistribution discussions are uncommon.
The incentive for overspending and developing programs that exceed annual allotments is problematic because future excess funds may not be sufficient to cover the costs of these expanded programs.
We suggest that future excess funds should not go to overspending states but rather be used to develop specific performance targets that could eventually be linked to bonus payments. If the current redistribution to overspending states is continued, the funds should be used to meet the needs of the target population as first priority.
Program goals should be refined as funds are being used for expanded eligibility levels and eligibility categories to allow states to use unspent funds to reach additional target populations once the original target population's needs are addressed.
Performance
There are currently no specific performance measures built into the SCHIP funding formula or set-aside bonuses for states that meet program targets. Indeed, there is significant variability in the implementation of SCHIP across states and wide variability in program outcomes. In an earlier study, we found considerable variation in the impact of SCHIP on changes in uninsurance rates for children. Between 1996 and 2002, we found a significant decrease in the number of uninsured children in only fifteen states, with an overall estimated increase in coverage of 1.7 percent (Blewett, Davern, and Rodin 2004 ). Yet consistent performance measures are difficult to define given the variability in program design at the state level.
Achievement of program goals is often discussed in terms of evaluating public programs, but very rarely is it explicitly included in federal funding allocation formulas. Most public program performance initiatives take the form of bonuses, penalties, or incentive grants to the states. We recommend that a proportion of unspent SCHIP funds in future years be put into a development fund that would be used to produce consistent and reliable performance measures. This fund could support statelevel data strategy efforts as well as national efforts to reach consensus on the development of performance measures and data sources that can be used to measure and potentially reward performance across states.
A top priority is to assist states in the development and implementation of specific data strategies to assess changes in the number of low-income uninsured children. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services may want to consider a strategy similar to that implemented in the State Highway Safety Data Improvements Incentive Grants, which specifically targeted funds to activities that were designed to collect and report on program effectiveness. Incentive grants ($32 million from 1999 to 2002) were authorized to encourage states to "improve the timeliness, accuracy, completeness, uniformity, and accessibility of State data that could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Highway Safety programs" (U.S.
Department of Transportation 1998).
This recommendation also addresses the Office of Management and Budget concern that there is limited evidence about the impact of SCHIP on increases in coverage and on the health status of low-income uninsured children (Office of Management and Budget 2004) . Again, effort will be required to develop consistent definitions, measurements, and data inputs.
Accuracy of Measurement
We recommend that the government should replace the low-income child component of the CCF estimates with direct survey estimates of the number of low-income children in each state based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS).
The small CPS-ASEC sample used to estimate the number of lowincome children and the number of low-income uninsured leads to huge variance, making maximum federal grant allocations subject to large error. The base-year estimates used to set floors and ceilings for grants are particularly affected because they are based on the CPS-ASEC numbers from the period before sample size was expanded, and errors in base-year data create bias by persisting in future years. We propose two ways in which Congress could lower the variance of the CCF of the SCHIP formula by making use of the Census Bureau's new American Community Survey, which was implemented in 2006.
We also suggest the development of a small-area estimation model that makes use of both the CPS and ACS data to develop model-based estimates to be used in the CCF of the SCHIP funding formula.
The ACS presents an opportunity to greatly reduce the variance of one of the estimates used in the CCF. The ACS is a large household survey in the United States with an annual sample of 3 million beginning in 2005 (Alexander 1998 ). The ACS is almost identical to the decennial census long form and will be administered every year. Like the census long form, the ACS is able to count the number of children living in a state that are below 200 percent of FPL, and it could be used to replace the CPS estimate of low-income children in the CCF of the SCHIP formula. Using the ACS data to estimate the number of children below 200 percent of FPL would shrink the variance in the current SCHIP formula by as much as 67 percent on average (Davern et al. 2003a ). There are two drawbacks to using the ACS. First, it does not currently contain health insurance items, and unless modified, the CPS is still the most consistent state source of health insurance coverage data. Second, the number of children and the state proportion of children estimated to be living in families with incomes below 200 percent of FPL will, in the ACS, vary from the CPS so that an initial shift in the data source could cause fairly large differences in allotments among the states (Davern et al. 2003a) .
The precision of the per state CPS estimate of children below 200 percent of FPL without health insurance coverage could also be improved by using a small-area model-based technique. The Census Bureau is currently experimenting with the use of a Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) model to develop more precise estimates of the number of uninsured children living below 200 percent of FPL within each state (Fisher and Campbell 2002) . The model-based estimates could also use the SCHIP enrollment data, further enhancing the overall measure of need for the program. Model-based estimates would combine the strengths of the CPS (health insurance measurement) with the strengths of the ACS (lower variances) to make possible an even better SCHIP formula. The gains in precision that could come from the combination of the large ACS sample size for poverty data, CPS uninsurance data, SCHIP enrollment data, and the SAIPE-type model could greatly improve the current SCHIP formula.
Modeling of this type is currently used for Title I education funding for smaller geographic areas such as school districts and counties, and an evaluation of this technique has supported its use (National Research Council 2000) . Producing state estimates of the number of children below 200 percent of FPL without health insurance should be a logical extension of this work. There is the concern, however, that the introduction of model-based estimates into the formula may also introduce more bias. The loss function of the current SAIPE estimates attempts to minimize a loss function of the difference between the surveys-estimated rate, which is considered to be the best "unbiased" source, and the model-based rate, which is considered to be biased (ibid.). However, the amount of additional bias can be controlled through strategies that use the direct survey estimate to produce model-based estimates by minimizing the difference between the two through the use of loss function that compares the modelbased estimates to the survey-based estimates. Furthermore, the modelbased estimates make explicit tradeoffs between bias and variance by attempting to minimize the sum of the total amount of estimate variance and total estimate bias (ibid.). If research in this area continues to show that model-based estimates are preferable, then these models should be considered to replace the current SCHIP formula estimates.
The census should include individual states or aggregations of similar states in its imputation as sample size allows, or it should use a method that would impute multiple possible values, rather than a single value, for these variables.
As noted earlier, year-by-year estimates also have bias because census imputations for missing values of income and health care coverage variables do not incorporate variations across states. Using state-level information, when available, is an important component of the imputation process for income and health insurance coverage.
We propose two approaches for addressing concerns about bias in the current CPS estimates of the CCF of the SCHIP formula. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses. First, the Census Bureau could change its current hot-deck procedure to capture more of the between-state variation for both estimates of income and health insurance coverage. Although it is not possible to use each state as a factor in the imputation process because of sample-size requirements in the hot-deck procedure, it is feasible to use some aggregation of similar states to compute missing values for both the coverage and income variables .
Second, the Census Bureau could replace its current hot-deck methodology with a multiple imputation method. Multiple imputation is preferable from a statistical standpoint, but it has some practical drawbacks. As the name implies, multiple imputation does not just impute one value for each missing item, it imputes multiple values (e.g., anywhere from two to ten values) using a model-based maximum likelihood approach (Rubin 1996) . The imputed values are then used to estimate multiple models, and the coefficients from these models are averaged together. This type of technique can use many more data inputs in the imputation model (for example, all fifty states and Washington, DC, can be covariates). The major drawback is that multiple imputation changes the way analysts interact with the data. Instead of running each analysis once, analysts need to run the analysis ten times (Rubin 1996) , and an average of the ten results will need to be derived (i.e., a regression model would need to be run ten times, once with each set of imputed values, and the average of the coefficients would need to be taken as a final step). This would be a difficult adjustment for most data analysts unless statistical packages develop canned routines for this type of analysis.
Final Comments
The State Children's Health Insurance Program provides a useful case study to assess how state legislation that articulates program goals and design is implemented through a federal funding formula. Clearly, the program is reaching intended target populations and creating new innovative state programs to enroll previously uninsured low-income children. Our hope is that the Congress will take the lessons learned in the first years of program implementation to refine the program to better target scarce public dollars, effectively encourage state participation, and develop mechanisms to evaluate and reward performance.
Finally, using national survey data is a common approach to developing estimates of the inputs to federal funding formulas. Yet survey data have limitations in terms of estimating narrow target populations due to sample size, survey content, and bias. Our analysis of SCHIP highlights the importance of evaluating the operationalization of need, the data source, and the estimation procedures used in federal funding formulas as a means to recommend refinements to the system of allotting federal funds.
In addition, it is important to note that adding samples causes diminishing returns in precision. Each additional sample does not buy as much precision as the one before it. While spending $10 million on CPS-ASEC sample expansion reduced the variance of estimates substantially, we believe that some additional funds should be directed to the Census Bureau to produce model-based estimates. However, a small-area model will not relieve the bias in the state income and health insurance estimates due to missing data imputation. In order to fix this problem, the Census Bureau needs to modify its hot-deck imputation procedure (in the short run) and consider using alternative imputation strategies, such as multiple imputations from key variables, in the future.
We believe the formula should be part of the discussion of the SCHIP reauthorization because improved estimation techniques and better data are available, and they could be incorporated into the formula. A phasedin approach to any significant change can be adopted to ameliorate wide fluctuations in state funding levels from one year to the next. We acknowledge that discussion of changes to the SCHIP funding formula will stimulate political discussion of winners and losers and those with more political clout will likely have an influence over the legislative compromise on the formula debate. Politics is, by definition, "the methods or tactics involved in managing a . . . government." Because the formula is written in statute, it cannot be changed except by an act of Congress. The role of analysts is to provide the best inputs and approach to formula estimation. One important objective is to appropriately and effectively target limited public resources to those defined by a program to need it. The outcome is some likely combination of the best data inputs and a political process that is perhaps suboptimal from an analyst position but optimal from a political decision-making point of view.
Policy decisions are often made in a flurry of activity and competing demands. Federal funding formulas attempt to allocate funds equitably and efficiently, but their operationalization often falls short of these goals. The result is a compromise of competing objectives and conflicting policy goals. The role of the analyst is to provide policymakers with the information they need by highlighting technical issues with the formula and by suggesting revisions to the formula, data sources, and estimation procedures to meet the goals of the federal programs. We have made several suggestions here that may be applicable to other programs - exploring model-based estimates combining survey and administrative data and using data from the new annual ACS.
